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Abstract 
This paper presents an explanatory analysis of the political economy of recent labour market reforms recently 
implemented in Italy. Analysing preferences for a general reduction in employment protection through 2011-13 
ITANES survey data, results are partially in line with the insider-outsider theory: self-employed, retired people, 
managers, craft business and shop owners are in favour of such institutional change as are retired that are not 
concerned by this kind of reform. Support from “outsiders”, unemployed and atypical workers did not strongly 
emerge. Ideologically, positive opinions are widespread among right-wing voters whilst people feeling close to trade 
unions oppose it. Geographically, consensus is greater in the industrialised North-East of the country. Comparing 
our results with findings on voting behaviour in 2013, we advance the hypothesis that the current incumbents’ 
political strategy is not as paradoxical as it seems. At odds with the idea of socialist parties defending “insiders” 
unionised workers and in line with a generalised detachment between the working class and socialist parties, both 
the main leftist and centrist parties in the ruling coalition are in fact gaining consensus among the social groups that 
are the most favourable to labour market flexibilisation, making these policy consistent with an attempt to please 
these constituencies. 
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I. Introduction 
As many other capitalist societies, Italy has recently undergone a process of liberalization 
in several institutional domains (Thelen, 2014, Amable at al. 2012, Jackson and Deeg 
2012, Rangone and Solari 2012, Baccaro and Howell 2001). Dramatic changes have 
recently occurred and are occurring in labour market regulation.  
After ambiguous institutional changes, inspired by CMEs during the 1990s and by LMEs 
during the 2000s (Della Sala, 2004), during the current crisis, the last Berlusconi’s 
government and the three governments after his, with Monti, Letta and Renzi as prime 
ministers, have progressively flexibilised the labour market.  Labour market flexibilisation 
reforms were perfectly in line with the agenda of a right wing liberal government as 
Berlusconi’s. They were explicitly part of Monti’s mandate to implement the “essential 
measures” suggested by European institutions to overcome the Italian debt crisis. The 
last two governments led by the left-wing Democratic Party have implemented 
flexbilisation measures, as well.  
While it is too soon to thoroughly evaluate the effects of the latest reform, the “Jobs act” 
seems to be negatively perceived by voters. According to a recent poll2, 50% of the 
interviewed believe that it will not improve employment while 28% consider it beneficial 
to the firms only and 20% detrimental to both employers and workers. In a 2012 poll 
Monti government’s actions in the field of labour and social policies were negatively 
assessed by 70% of the interviewees3.      
Yet, these apparently unpopular institutional changes were implemented leading to 
reverse Emmenegger (2013)’s question: why is it so “easy” to flexibilise the labour 
market, including reducing dismissal protection in contemporary Italy?  
The aim of the paper is to analyse the political demand for labour market flexibilisation 
and investigate the apparent paradox of these labour market reforms under a coalition 
governments led by the major left wing party. In fact, in a dualised labour market as the 
Italian one, a centre-left party is supposed to protect the insiders, the unionised and 
protected workers, who should oppose a more flexibile labour market (Rueda, 2005, 
2006).   
                                                          
2 Published on Corriere della Sera, Novemebr, 23rd, 2014. Accessed at: 
http://www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it/GestioneDomande.aspx 
3 Retrieved from: http://www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it/GestioneDomande.aspx 
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Investigating the political demand can shed light on a second peculiar feature of these 
reforms, their unilateral character. In fact, despite fulfilling some the conditions for the 
emergence of social pacts in the literature (Ahlquist, 2010; Baccaro and Simoni, 2008; 
Baccaro and Ling, 2007, Natali, 2004), both Monti and Renzi’s governments have 
adopted them unilaterally. One possible explanation provided stems from the decline in 
the power of trade unions (Culpepper and Regan, 2014).  
Here we advance another evidence-based interpretation: the traditional left-wing 
constituency of unionised manual workers that, as insiders, should oppose this reform 
might not be at the centre of the social coalition the incumbent are seeking support from 
(Amable et al. 2012), at least with this specific policy measure.  
The paper proceeds with a brief overview of the last institutional changes in the labour 
market and industrial relations realms in section II. Section III reviews the literature on 
preferences for labour market policies. Section IV presents the empirical analysis and 
section VI advances an interpretation of the results. Section V concludes. 
 
II. The latest institutional changes in the Labour Market and 
Industrial relations system 
The deinstitutionalisation of labour market rules started at the end of the 1980s and 
deepened from the 1990s on (Rangone and Solari, 2012). After the cut in wage 
indexation and then its abolition in 1992, major changes occurred under a centre-left and 
centre-right government respectively: in 1997 the “Treu” law introduced temporary 
agency work and in 2003 “Biagi” law legalised a series of flexible contracts and 
deregulated part-time work. After the 2007 reregulation, which established that open-
ended contracts are the main form of employment contract and limited short-term 
contracts renewal, in 2008 Berlusconi’s government allows plant agreements to derogate 
from national legislation in contract termination. With the Fornero law (92/2012) under 
Monti’s government and the Poletti decree (24/2014) and the so called “jobs act” law 
(92/2014) under Renzi’s government, the labour market is being further flexibilised (see 
Table I in the appendix for a summary). Reflecting the result of the 2012 Fornero law, 
between 2012 and 2013 the OECD employment protection legislation (EPL) indicators 
for individual dismissal in regular employment passed from 2.76 to 2.51 and for collective 
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dismissal from 4.13 to 3.75.4  In contrast with previous reforms, it increased exit 
flexibility by reducing the costs of collective dismissals and deregulating individual 
dismissals5. 
Renzi’s government has then further deregulated the use of fixed-term contracts with the 
so called “Poletti decree”, and, more importantly, has introduced the the “contratto a 
tutele crescenti”, a single open-ended contract with employment protection increasing 
with tenure. Only temporary incentives to use this form of contract are provided in the 
form of three years reduction in social contribution. It also abolished only some types of 
atypical contracts which might lead to an overall increase in uncertainty on the labour 
market (Cappellari and Leonardi, 2015).6 This new form of contract is not covered by the 
article 18 of the Workers’ statute that imposes the worker’s reinstatement to the firm 
after an illegitimate lay-off and which has been at the centre of the political debate for 
decades.7 Reinstatement is instead substituted by monetary compensation increasing with 
tenure.  
About its effectiveness on labour market outcomes, short term evidence is mixed: while 
according to multiple institutional data sources employment under open ended contracts 
has increased at the end of 20158, Fana et al. (2015) show that this is mainly due to 
contract transformation rather than employment creation, contrary to OECD (2015a) 
forecasts. Fana et al. (2015) also show that more than 40% of new open-ended contracts 
are part time and guarantee lower monthly wages than old contracts did the year before.  
The Jobs act was very much welcomed by Confindustria, the major business association, 
whose president regarded it as “going towards the right direction”9. The employers 
association has even expelled a firm that wanted to derogate from it and still guarantee 
the respect of article 18 to newly hired.10 The three major trade unions have instead 
criticised it for de facto enhancing precarity11 and have never been substantially involved 
in the reform process. Renzi’s government, as its predecessors Monti’s (Culpepper and 
Regan, 2014), has clearly adopted a unilateral strategy to implement important reforms: 
                                                          
4 Source OECD: goo.gl/z7ykX1. 
5 See the report  Ministero del lavoro e delle politiche sociali (2014) « Il primo anno di applicazione della legge 92/2012 », 
Quaderno 1, 01/2014. 
6 Cappellari and Leonardi (2015), http://www.lavoce.info/archives/32503/quanta-instabilita-contratti-termine/ 
7 See http://www.lavoce.info/archives/30260/eterno-dibattito-articolo-18/ 
8 Anastasia (2016), http://www.lavoce.info/archives/40005/occupazione-dopo-lo-scalino-di-fine-2015/ 
9 http://goo.gl/vC1TAc 
10 http://goo.gl/ck6V3F 
11 http://goo.gl/X3yFWL 
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the Minister of Labour Poletti declared “We will be listening but there will be no 
negotiation” (December 19th, 2014).12  
Even though Italy is characterised by an overall high level of interest group pluralism 
(Lijphart, 2012), these recent institutional changes challenge some of the findings in the 
literature of social pacts. The degree of coordination in Italy evolved in a non-linear way: 
low in the 1960s and part of the 1980s, high levels were achieved in the 1970s, the period 
of the “political exchange” (Pizzorno in Baccaro and Simoni, 2008) marked by the 
approval of the Workers’ Statute. In the aftermaths of the 1992 crisis Italy seemed to 
move towards a more neo-corporatist system: to obtain the abolishment of wage 
indexation and two pension reforms aimed at the reducing public expenditure to access 
the Euro zone, the “technical” governments in 1992 and 1995 successfully engaged in 
tripartite negotiations. In 1994, trade unions acted as veto players determining the failure 
of the confrontational approach adopted by the first Berlusconi government (Natali, 
2004). Then, in the 2000s, informal centralisation of industry and firm level bargaining by 
peak associations (one side, or only some unions) with or without government 
participation13 prevailed while further social pacts became less and less effective (Regini 
and Colombo, 2009), until the “Pact for welfare” in 2007, as part of the leftist coalition 
political strategy.14  
Since then, a tendency towards pluralism seems to emerge despite the presence of the 
conditions that usually lead to bargaining. High unemployment and pressure to enter the 
European Monetary Union are among the most important determinants of social pacts 
(Ahlquist, 2010), including the ones implemented in Italy in the 1990s.  
Mutatis muntandins, these elements are present during the current crisis but have not led 
to tripartite bargaining process. The unemployment rate passed from 8.4% in 2011 to 
12.2% in 2013 and pressure from the European Union was explicit in the letter addressed 
by M.Draghi and Trichet to the Prime Minister Berlusconi which contained a series of 
“essential measures” to be implemented, including decentralisation of the bargaining 
process and flexibilisation on the labour market.  
It is also argued that social pacts arise in the presence of weak governments willing to 
find consensus in the corporatist arena (Baccaro and Simoni, 2008; Baccaro and Ling, 
2007, Natali, 2004). This argument may not apply to Renzi, whose political strength 
                                                          
12 Source: http://goo.gl/NiRAUG. 
13 From ICTWSS database (http://www.uva-aias.net/208). 
14 “The producers’ pact” in Amable, Guillaud and Palombarini (2012). 
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stems from the primary elections that made him the secretary of his party and his 
widespread consensus in the population, but it certainly holds for Monti’s government, 
whose political party gathered only 8.3% share in 2013 elections.  
How could a unilateral strategy be adopted, then? Culpepper and Regan (2014) suggest 
that the collapse of social partnership is due to the weakness of trade unions: they have 
lost their capacity to mobilize consent (“the carrot”) and organize strikes (“the stick”) and 
they have nothing to offer to policy makers. This is certainly an influencing factor and 
unions’ weakening process is a phenomenon that reaches beyond the Italian case. 
Nonetheless, between 1970 and 2010 trade union density in Italy has declined by 4%, a 
negligible extent if compared to France (-64 %) or Germany (- 42%), and collective 
bargaining coverage remained unchanged at 85%. Case study evidence in manufacturing 
sectors also showed that social partners have maintained their bargaining role at the 
organisation level (Regalia and Colombo, 2016).  
Here we propose a complementary approach that, tries to interpret the Italian pattern of 
liberalisation as stemming from the political coalition that currently dominates its political 
economy. A tough unilateral approach towards reforms, instead of engaging in tripartite 
bargaining, could be explained by the fact that the last three coalition governments are 
implementing a political strategy that excludes unionised workers (Amable et al., 2012; 
Häusermann and Gingrich, 2015).  
After reviewing the literature on preferences for Labour market institutions, we will 
present an empirical analysis of the political demand for flexibilisation as expressed in 
2011-2013 survey data and interpret the results. 
 
III. On the preferences for labour market reforms 
As in other European countries, the progressive flexibilisation of the Italian labour 
market has originated a segmented system (Jackson and Deeg, 2012) creating an insider 
outsider divide that could translate into divergent political preferences.  
The insider-outsider theory stems back from Doeringer and Piore (1971) who 
distinguished the internal labour market from the external and competitive labour market, 
based on the rigidity of pricing and allocation of labour rules. Skill specificity and on-the-
job training would in fact make turn over costly and create the incentive for more rigid 
rules defining the internal labour market. According to Saint-Paul (2000) not only this 
microeconomic frictions but also rigid market institutions allow insiders to benefit from 
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.23
rents to the detriment of unemployed15 and highly skilled employees, living under the 
rules of the flexible outside market. Thus, labour is divided along the lines of both 
employment status and skill levels. Concerning reforms, Saint-Paul (2000) explains rather 
their absence as there would be a preference for the status quo and a self-entertaining 
circle of rents originating constituencies defending those rents. Flexibilisation is thus 
difficult, even if possible under favourable contingent conditions. For instance, when an 
economic crisis pushes insiders into unemployment, the outsiders’ constituency increases 
in size and makes flexibilisation politically feasible.  
Rueda (2005, 2006) also suggests that the insiders/outsiders divide shape preferences for 
active labour market policies (ALMP) and employment protection (EPL). The upscale 
class, mainly self-employed and managers, should oppose both labour market policies. 
Insiders, employed with full-time open-ended contracts or voluntarily with part-time or 
short term contracts, should be against ALMP and for EPL whilst outsiders, including 
unemployed, involuntarily part-time and short-term workers and students, would see in a 
reduction of EPL and increase in ALMP a chance to exit unemployment or precarious 
employment. Furthermore, about Italy Thelen (2014) argues that the allocation of greater 
resources to short-time work policies rather than active labour market policies would be 
the signal of a relative strength of the insiders compared to the outsiders. 
Instead of relying on the employment status, Häuserman and Schwander (2011) advance 
an alternative conceptualisation of this divide based on occupation and social class rather 
than employment status at a specific point in time. They argue that this more subtle 
conceptualization of the insider-outsider status better explains individual preferences for 
different welfare policies.  
Regarding the insider/outsider theory, evidence from a French survey on preferences for 
the introduction of the “contrat de travail unique” (CTU), equivalent of the Jobs act 
“contratto a tutele crescenti”, is mixed. Guillaud and Marx (2014) show that there is no 
significant cleavage in preferences between employees under open-ended and temporary 
contracts as claimed by this theory but, consistently with it, unemployed seem to support 
flexibilisation. Furthermore, being unionised appears to decrease support to the reform. 
Amable (2014) finds no support among the outsiders for this reform and concludes that 
this can be attributed to the fact that they might identify themselves with insiders if their 
chances to eventually get an open ended position are high. Retired and elder skilled 
                                                          
15 In Saint-Paul’s (2000) framework unvoluntary unemployement would not exist in a perfectly competitive labour market, 
in line with neoclassical economic theory. 
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employees seem to be supportive as not concerned or confident in their employment 
perspectives. Ideologically, left-wing voters seem to have a negative opinion on the CTU, 
as opposed to centre and right wing voters.   
The French results offer an interesting insight on the Italian case: in 2013 more than 80% 
of new employment contracts were short-term ones, making it less probable for the 
Italian outsiders to identify with insiders even considering their employment perspectives. 
Thus, we expect the insiders/outsiders divide to emerge. As in France, we expect age to 
be a relevant factor as the young experience a particularly difficult employment situation: 
in 2013 the employment rate of 15-24 years old was only 16.8% against the average 
55.7% and their unemployment rate (almost 30% among 18-29 years old) increased at a 
higher pace than for the rest of the active population (Ministero del lavoro, 2014).  
 
IV. Empirical analysis 
We use data from the ITANES inter-electoral survey from 2011 to 201316. It covers 
5,414 individuals interviewed via telephone through the CATI system. The panel was 
collected in five waves. Four waves include the question of interest: February-March 
2011, May-June 2012, January-February 2013 and March 2013. The last wave does not 
include socio-economic questions and had to be excluded from the econometric analysis. 
The question analysed asks 5,414 interviewees to express their agreement or disagreement 
with this claim: “Firms should have greater freedom to hire and fire”.17 Answers range from 1 “I 
strongly disagree” to 5 “I strongly agree”. This question is quite general, as it does not 
explicitly concern a specific policy measure and not directly policies to loosen 
employment protection legislation. Nonetheless, it reveals preferences for a change in the 
status quo and a change towards greater freedom for firms in the labour market.  
In the following sections, we first present a descriptive statistics analysis of survey data, 
then, the results of two sets of models. Drawing from the literature, one set utilises 
employment status and the second set occupation as main explanatory variables for 
preferences on labour market flexibilisation. For both sets we compare results from a 
binary logit model, an ordered logit model and random effects ordered logit model.  
 
 
                                                          
16 Source http://www.itanes.org/ 
17 Original question: “Le leggerò ora alcune affermazioni su politica ed economia che vengono fatte correntemente. Mi dica per ognuna se lei è 
per niente, poco, abbastanza o molto d'accordo: Le imprese dovrebbero essere lasciate più libere di assumere e licenziare”. 
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IV.I Descriptive statistics 
As summarised in Table 1, the statement is overall opposed by on average 53.4% of the 
respondents disagree while 37.3% are in favour. This is somehow consistent with the 
unpopularity of the “Jobs act” reform in polls in the press, even if there is a slight 
increase in agreement through time.  
 
TABLE 1: Distribution of answers to “Firms should have greater freedom to hire and fire” 
Waves Dates Government Disagree       Agree  
1 February-March 2011 Berlusconi 55.51% 44.49% 
3 May-June 2012 Monti 53.09% 46.91% 
4 January-February 2013 Monti/Letta 51.29% 48.71% 
5 March 2013 Monti/Letta 53.84% 46.16% 
Average   53.43% 46.57% 
 
Concerning the distribution of preferences over employment status, data do not allow do 
disentangle part-time and full-time employees or workers bound by open-ended or short-
term contracts. We therefore look at self-employed, employees, inactive and unemployed 
respectively. In Graph 1.1, we can see that the self-employed are the only category that 
shows an overall positive attitude towards greater dismissal freedom. Inactive people, 
mainly composed of retired people and housewives, are split in half with a slightly 
prevalent negative attitude. Both unemployed and employed individuals express a 
negative opinion. In line with Rueda (2005), the self-employed or “upscale” group, are in 
favour, whilst in contrast with the insider-outsider theory outsiders do not show support 
for greater flexibilisation. Disagreement is less widespread among unemployed but the 
majority of them oppose greater flexibilisation.  
Trends in Graph 1.2 show an overall convergence towards greater consensus in all 
employment status categories. The majority of employed and unemployed remain 
nonetheless against.   
Turning towards occupations, they were grouped following the ISCO-08 classification 
and we can see in Graph 2.1 that, along with managers, craft and sales workers are the 
categories that show a positive attitude, consistently with previous results: they are self-
employed as in most of the cases they own their own shops or craft businesses. The 
majority of professionals, clerical workers, technicians and manual workers are instead 
against. Graph 2.2 shows that support has increased through time among professionals, 
managers, craft workers, clerical workers and manual workers. It has decreased among 
technicians and services workers.  
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Graph 1.1: Employment status and agreement on Labour Market flexibilisation: averages 
 
 
Graph 1.2: Employment status and support for Labour Market flexibilisation: trends 
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Graph 2.1: Occupation and support for Labour Market flexibilisation: averages 
 
Graph 2.2: Occupation and support for Labour Market flexibilisation: trends 
 
 
As ideology appears to influence preferences on labour market policies (Amable, 2014), 
we expect the respondents’ ideological stands to be even more relevant given the general 
character of the question analysed. In fact, in Graph 3, we can see the percentage of 
people that agree or disagree and their self-placement on a political left-right scale. There 
is a clear cleavage between right and left-wing individuals. Disagreement is greater among 
people that declare a leftist political ideology, the opposite occurs for people on the 
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Graph 3: Left-right self-placement and support for Labour Market liberalisation 
 
 
The ideological bias is also confirmed if we look at individuals’ voting (Graph 4 and 5). 
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Graph 4: 2008 Vote and support for Labour Market Liberalisation 
 
 
 
Graph 5: 2013 Vote and support for Labour Market Liberalisation 
 
 
Lastly we turn towards trade union membership. Disagreement is slightly higher among 
Trade Unions members (67.4%) than average. Since a direct question on membership 
was only asked in 2013, to analyse trends we look at the following question:   
“On 0-10 scale, to what extent to you trust the following institutions? (0 means complete distrusts and 
10 complete trust)”.18 People that replied from 6 to 10 are considered as having a positive 
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18
 Author’s translation from Italian. 
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Graph 6: Trust in Trade Unions and support for Labour Market Liberalisation 
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categorised as left (from 0 to 2), centre-left (3 and 4), centre (5), centre-right (6 and 7) 
and right (from 8 to 10). Being member of a trade union is also a factor that we need to 
control for. Lacking this direct information, we use a proxy: a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 when individuals answer positively to the question “How much trust do you have 
in Trade Unions?” showing at least some sympathy to their positions.  
Lastly, as stressed by the OECD (2015b) in the 2015 Economic survey on Italy, the 
historical geographical divide has even deepened during the recession. We therefore 
control for the geographical areas North-West, North-East, Centre and South as defined 
by the national institute of statistics ISTAT.  Empirically, the experience of diverse 
regional labour markets might lead to geographical clusters of standard errors for which 
we control for in all models as well. 
In ordered to test for the other possible conceptualisation of the insider-outsider divide 
(Häuserman and Schwander, 2011), we run a second series of models (see TABLE 3) in 
which we use occupation instead of employment status as explanatory variable. All other 
controls are maintained.  
To exclude multicollinearity among variables, we performed tests on polychoric  
correlation that allow us to consider the issue not relevant in our case (Table AII in the 
Appendix). 
Results of the models on employment status (Table 2) confirm that being self-employed 
and inactive significantly influences a positive attitude compared to employees 
consistently throughout all models. Tuning towards the outsiders, being unemployed is 
also significant in showing agreement but the result is insignificant using the ordered logit 
model. Atypical workers do not seem significantly favourable. Because the question does 
not concern a reform that could reduce dualisation, atypical workers’ position is not 
entirely surprising as they might consider their precarious condition the result of the 
current level of employers’ freedom. This result had to be interpreted with caution as its 
robustness could be affected by the underrepresentation of this category in the data. 
Education levels are significant only when very low and not consistently in all models. 
Gender and, more surprisingly, age do not seem to play a role in shaping preferences. As 
expected, political ideology does influence the answers: compared to leftist, right-wing 
and centrist people agree with allowing firms greater freedom. Trusting trade unions is 
also a factor significantly related to disagreement. Geographical areas seem to influence 
preferences: people in North-Eastern Italy show support to a more flexible labour market 
as opposed to the Centre and the South. This is result is not surprising as North-Eastern 
regions are highly industrialised and host mainly micro, small and medium enterprises, in 
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which employees could more likely have preferences closer to their employers’ (Amable 
et al. 2014). 
 
TABLE 2: Estimation results of logit models with employment status 
 Binary Logit Ordered Logit Ordered Logit RE 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Employment status  
(ref. employed) 
   
Self-employed 0.738*** 0.690*** 0.956*** 
 (0.0842) (0.0962) (0.126) 
Atypical 0.148 0.0841 0.220 
 (0.315) (0.266) (0.286) 
Inactive 0.448*** 0.358*** 0.481*** 
 (0.0683) (0.0536) (0.0519) 
Unemployed 0.288** 0.207 0.361** 
 (0.134) (0.134) (0.151) 
Education level (ref: Middle 
School) 
   
Elementary or lower 0.194*** 0.0733* 0.0980 
 (0.0528) (0.0402) (0.0789) 
Professional degree -0.0132 -0.0302 -0.0208 
 (0.0226) (0.0436) (0.0692) 
Technical High School  -0.139** -0.113 -0.104 
 (0.0678) (0.0793) (0.125) 
High School Diploma -0.0840 -0.0239 -0.000376 
 (0.130) (0.111) (0.131) 
University Degree -0.00260 0.0188 0.0513 
 (0.0576) (0.0849) (0.107) 
Ideology (ref: Left)    
Centre-Left 0.271*** 0.384*** 0.469*** 
 (0.0961) (0.0654) (0.0793) 
Centre 0.935*** 0.987*** 1.133*** 
 (0.151) (0.176) (0.203) 
Centre-Right 1.215*** 1.313*** 1.462*** 
 (0.108) (0.144) (0.216) 
Right 1.640*** 1.671*** 1.930*** 
 (0.160) (0.190) (0.234) 
Does not know 0.704*** 0.839*** 1.044*** 
 (0.0673) (0.0271) (0.0665) 
No answer 0.706*** 0.817*** 1.081*** 
 (0.159) (0.140) (0.218) 
Trust Unions -0.431*** -0.428*** -0.504*** 
 (0.135) (0.122) (0.148) 
Geographic area (ref. North-
West) 
   
North-East 0.101*** 0.0556*** 0.00773 
 (0.00553) (0.00749) (0.00634) 
Centre -0.0361*** -0.0111 -0.0778*** 
 (0.0105) (0.00809) (0.00889) 
South -0.122*** -0.0273** -0.0931*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0108) (0.0115) 
Female -0.0293 -0.0234 -0.0220 
 (0.108) (0.104) (0.135) 
Age 0.00147 0.00301 0.00380 
 (0.00158) (0.00271) (0.00307) 
Wave 0.157*** 0.158*** 0.216*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0119) (0.0147) 
    
Number of Obs 5336 5557 5557 
Pseudo R2 0.0708 0.0409  
Wald Chi2 . . . 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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TABLE 3: Estimation results of probit models with occupation 
 Binary Logit Ordered Logit Ordered Logit RE 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Occupation (ref. Manual 
workers) 
   
Managers 0.519*** 0.652*** 0.971*** 
 (0.0898) (0.0425) (0.122) 
Professionals 0.357 0.491*** 0.653** 
 (0.245) (0.180) (0.260) 
Technicians 0.160* 0.271*** 0.407*** 
 (0.0881) (0.0591) (0.101) 
Clerical workers 0.168 0.240* 0.330** 
 (0.151) (0.131) (0.161) 
Sales Workers 0.498** 0.515** 0.809*** 
 (0.216) (0.214) (0.228) 
Craft workers 0.754*** 0.833*** 1.192*** 
 (0.291) (0.323) (0.451) 
Education level (ref: 
Middle School) 
   
Elementary or lower 0.245*** 0.118** 0.165* 
 (0.0519) (0.0547) (0.0878) 
Professional degree -0.0689*** -0.0832* -0.0890 
 (0.0236) (0.0438) (0.0686) 
Technical High School  -0.237*** -0.204*** -0.229*** 
 (0.0639) (0.0601) (0.0784) 
High School Diploma -0.159 -0.108 -0.118 
 (0.122) (0.115) (0.114) 
University Degree -0.162** -0.157** -0.184** 
 (0.0826) (0.0694) (0.0938) 
Ideology (ref: Left) 
Centre-Left 0.272*** 0.383*** 0.463*** 
 (0.102) (0.0679) (0.0821) 
Centre 0.926*** 0.987*** 1.130*** 
 (0.153) (0.176) (0.200) 
Centre-Right 1.210*** 1.313*** 1.458*** 
 (0.111) (0.145) (0.212) 
Right 1.647*** 1.685*** 1.943*** 
 (0.163) (0.188) (0.237) 
Does not know 0.701*** 0.857*** 1.059*** 
 (0.0540) (0.0381) (0.0665) 
No answer 0.838*** 0.902*** 1.132*** 
 (0.144) (0.114) (0.161) 
Trust Unions -0.408*** -0.403*** -0.487*** 
 (0.138) (0.127) (0.152) 
Geographic area (ref. 
North-West) 
   
North-east 0.111*** 0.0629*** 0.0199** 
 (0.00449) (0.00850) (0.00776) 
Centre -0.0484*** -0.0327*** -0.0975*** 
 (0.0134) (0.00904) (0.0121) 
South -0.114*** -0.0316* -0.0921*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0174) (0.0168) 
Female -0.0424 -0.0460 -0.0572 
 (0.110) (0.105) (0.138) 
Age 0.00232 0.00385 0.00427 
 (0.00214) (0.00338) (0.00286) 
Wave 0.149*** 0.150*** 0.211*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0116) (0.0159) 
    
Number of Obs 5336 5557 5557 
Pseudo R2 0.0674 0.0407  
Wald Chi2 . . . 
    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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TABLE 3 shows the results of the models which include professional categories instead 
of employment status to explain preferences. Consistently with the insider-outsider 
theory, the “upscale class” (Rueda, 2005) composed of managers are in favour of greater 
dismissal flexibility and so are craft and shop owners. Professionals and clerical workers 
also show significant support in the ordered logit models. Education seems to have an 
inverse relation with support as higher educated groups tend to show disagreement. The 
other results are the same as in the first set of models.   
 
V. Flexibilising the labour market from the left: an actual paradox? 
From the political supply side, in order to draw some conclusions on the political strategy 
adopted by the last three governments and particularly Monti’s and Renzi’s, it is necessary 
to look a posteriori at all measures adopted in a much more global manner. From the 
political demand side, voting behaviour is certainly not determined by one single policy 
measure. Here we focused one issue only, the flexibilisation of labour market, and the 
data only allows analysing general preferences for a change in the current situation but 
not for the specific reforms introduced. Nonetheless, despite being partial, the results 
obtained have some elements of interest. 
Even if voters of the main parties members of the coalition in office, the Democratic 
Party (PD) and Civic Choice (SC), are ideologically opposed to greater dismissal 
flexibility, interestingly, the socio-professional categories that agree with this proposal 
coincide with the social groups the most relevant among respective voters in 2013. 
In fact, Diamanti (2013) presents an analysis based on original data of the Italian’s voting 
behaviour during the last elections and shows that demographically, PD is gaining 
consensus particularly among seniors between 55 and 64 and over 65 years old where 
they gather 6.3 and almost 12 points more votes than in the whole population. 
Consistently, the socio-professional category the most represented in its constituency is 
composed of retired people followed by a wider category that includes managers and 
bureaucrats and, lastly, professionals. Conversely, blue collars and unemployed 
decreasingly vote for PD to the benefit of the 5 Stars Movement for which they represent 
two major components of its constituency.19  
Retired, professionals and managers are also part of the categories that reveal a positive 
attitude towards labour market flexibilisation in our analysis. Turning towards the second 
component of the current majoritarian coalition in office, Civic Choice led by Monti, the 
                                                          
19 Similar results can be found in D’Alimonte (2013). 
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picture looks quite similar as retired, managers and professionals also vote more for the 
centrist parties than the national average. 
Contrary to what Rueda (2005) hypothesised, a government led by a socialist party might 
reduce employment protection legislation, at least in the particular context of 
contemporary Italy. The ideological distance between the Democratic Party and the 
centrist parties seem to have reduced leaving room to the opposition party 5 Stars 
Movement to occupy the left side of the political offer (Conti, 2013). In this framework 
and limited to this specific policy measure it could be strategic for the incumbent 
coalition to please the “upscale” group, as growing component of the main parties’ 
constituencies. This is also in line with a stream of literature that has argued for an 
increasing loosening of the relationship between left wing parties and the working class in 
Western democracies (Boyer, 2010, Häusermann and Gingrich, 2015).  
Our findings are certainly only a hint that at least in the field of employment protection 
legislation, the last governement coalitions are moving towards a strategy that could be 
consistent with the emergence of a “bloc bourgeois” as argued by Amable et al. (2012). 
The centrist alliance that has supported the last three governments could have in fact 
strategically chosen to please the declared interests of big firms and the highest strata of 
society, excluding the interests of unionised manual workers. These social groups have 
gained strength in the respective constituency of the main incumbent parties, including 
the democratic one. If this new socio-political configuration is really emerging in Italy it is 
certainly too soon to say and goes beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, our 
findings are consistent with this hypothesis. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper is an attempt to provide some insight on the progressive flexibilisation of the 
labour market that Italy has recently experienced. The last three governements, and in 
particularly Monti’s and Renzi’s, have reduced employment protection engaging in 
unilateral reforms that were warmly welcomed by the major business association and 
opposed by trade unions. The fact that coalition governments that heavily rely on the 
support of a centre-left party might seem paradoxical as socialist parties are usually 
considered the insiders’ defendant (Rueda, 2005). 
Through an analysis of survey data on increasing firms’ freedom to hire and dismiss, we 
analysed individuals’ preferences for employment protection reduction. As expected 
according to insiders/outsiders theory self-employed and inactive are favourable to this 
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measure compared to employees. Outsiders as unemployed and atypical workers show 
some support is not always significant throughout the econometrics analysis. In terms of 
occupation, managers show a positive attitude along with self-employed owning their 
shops or craft businesses. Feeling some closeness to trade unions and being to left of the 
ideological spectrum increases chances of taking a negative stand on the statement. 
Lastly, support is stronger in the industrialised North-Eastern regions of the country. 
Despite the apparent paradox that this kind of measure do not seem to encounter the 
favour of voters of two of the main incumbent parties, PD and SC, there is an interesting 
convergence among the social groups that support this measures and the ones that are 
gaining more strength within the respective constituencies. 
This could be a sign of a political strategy that seeks support from a new social bloc that 
excludes unionised workers and includes the interests of big firms and higher strata of 
society as advance in Amable et al. (2012), at least in this specific policy domain.      
Further research should look in a more encompassing way at the incumbent’s global 
political strategy in other policy domains. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table AI: Recent reforms in the Italian labour market 
 
Years Governments Main labour market interventions 
2008-2011 Berlusconi IV 
(centre-right) 
Legislative decree 176/2011: Reform of 
apprenticeship;  
Law 148/2011: plant agreements can derogate from 
the national legislation20 with respect to non 
discriminatory layoffs. 
Law 183/2011: deregulation of contract arrangements 
in part-time work; 
2012-2013 Monti 
(widespread 
coalition) 
Law 92/2012 (Fornero Law): deregulation in 
individual dismissals, stricter regulation of some types 
of independent work, changes in the regulation of 
apprenticeship and fixed-term contracts; reregulation 
of part-time work, changes in the unemployment 
benefits scheme. 
2013-2014 Letta (centre-
left led 
widespread 
coalition) 
Law 99/2013: temporary monetary incentives to hire 
young workers with open-ended contracts; 
deregulation of fixed-term contracts.  
2014- Renzi (centre-
left led 
widespread 
Law 34/2014 (Poletti decree): deregulation of fixed-
term contracts with a cap on their use compared to 
open-ended contracts, changes in the regulation of 
                                                          
20 http://www.uniba.it/ricerca/dipartimenti/scienze-politiche/docenti/prof.ssa-lauralba-bellardi/bellardi-
a.a.-2012-2013/art.-8-l.-148-2011.pdf 
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coalition) apprenticeship. 
Law 183/2014 (Jobs act): single open-ended contract 
with protection increasing with tenure; abolition of 
some atypical contracts; looser rules on jobs paid via 
hourly vouchers; deregulation of individual dismissals; 
reform of unemployment benefits and ALMP. 
 Source: Sacchi (2013) and http://goo.gl/PNim9K 
 
 
Table AII: Polychoric Correlation Matrix 
 Ordered 
preferences 
Employment 
status 
Occupation Education Trust 
Unions 
Left-
Right 
self-
placement 
Female Geographic 
area 
Ordered 
preferences  1 0,0675 0,0040 -0,0601 
-
0,1975 0,2313 0,0035 -0,0108 
Employment 
status 0,0675 1 0,5390 -0,2979 
-
0,0504 0,3286 0,1801 0,1183 
Occupation 
0,0040 0,5390 1 -0,2988 
-
0,0086 0,2384 0,2752 0,1163 
Education -0,0601 -0,2979 -0,2988 1 0,0822 -0,1783 -0,0802 0,0162 
Trust 
Unions 
-0,1975 -0,0504 -0,0086 0,0822 1 -0,3142 -0,0023 -0,0644 
Left-Right 
self-
placement 
0,2313 0,3286 0,2384 -0,1783 
-
0,3142 1 0,1521 0,0339 
Female 
0,0035 0,1801 0,2752 -0,0802 
-
0,0023 0,1521 1 -0,0110 
Geographic 
area -0,0108 0,1183 0,1163 0,0162 
-
0,0644 0,0339 -0,0110 1 
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